“Rev. Jim Cerezo was ordained as a priest at the St. John Cathedral on the 30th of November 2004.” This is a very straightforward and factual statement. It consists of a subject (I, Rev. Jim Cerezo), an event (ordination to the priesthood), a place where such event occurred (St. John Cathedral) and the date of occurrence (November 30, 2004). Such event occurring would be corroborated by hundreds of witnesses (which included my bishop, my fellow priests, my relatives and friends). If this is not enough to substantiate the facticity of this event, I have numerous photographs and a video to prove it. As such, the above statement is not only valid and true but also verifiable in fact.
Yet, something is missing. While it is true that the above statement is a factual description of the event, it would be a grave understatement to say that it truly captured everything that is all to such event. The descriptive proposition fails to capture my feelings (of ecstatic joy, of being unworthy yet blessed, of walking as if I was in the clouds), my thoughts, the collective consciousness of the people, and the rituals that served to sustain and magnify the sacredness of the event. If the above statement is all that it is, then it would be no different if I just went to the bishop and ask him to ordain me right away in the cathedral with just the two of us and without all the fanfare and hooplas of a usual ordination rite. Such two contrasting ways of ordination, one in a context of a religious event and the other done hastily as if it was a minor business transaction, would still reflect the fact of the statement “Rev. Jim Cerezo was ordained as a priest at the St. John Cathedral on the 30th of November 2004.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his seminal work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, wrote, “A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it (4.01).” And further he would say, “A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality (4.06).” If not, then such language is relegated to the unsinnig – nonsensical. Professor Nubiola would say, “Meaning is the method of verification.” What cannot be verified is senseless or meaningless. Thus, Wittgenstein set out to put a limit to the bounds of language, outside of which was the realm of nonsense. Sadly, relegated to this realm of non-sense are the traditional metaphysics and, consequently even moral, ethical and religious discourses, which became victims of Wittgenstein’s purgation in his quest to “clarify propositions (4.112).” To further seal their fate, Wittgenstein admonishes us – “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (7).”
Indeed, if such is the case, then most of the things in this world we hold dear (like friendship, love, religion, etc.), majority of which cannot be verified strictly in fact, are what Wittgenstein would call unsinnig. If such is the case, then we are better of as mutes – unable to say anything at all.
The statement about my ordination is an example of how a factual, verifiable proposition can be insufficient to describe or picture the reality that took place. We hear the expression often enough – “Words just can’t describe it.” And we have our share of such experiences. The statement, “His first child was born.,” cannot capture the father’s joy when he holds his child the first time or the statement, “His mother died.,” is insufficient as a proposition to describe the anguish of such a lost to a child. Yes, propositions picture reality but more often than not these propositions are just means to a higher or bigger reality that is simply indescribable by words.
“Light travels at 300,000 km./sec.” is a proposition that is a fact and verifiable and tested by many scientists. “My friend loves me.” is a proposition that, strictly speaking, cannot be verified. For all I know he might be deceiving me and hides this deception very well or a practitioner of Sun-Tzu’s adage, “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.” How does one quantify or prove a friendship? I just have to rely on my trust (or faith) that this friend does love me. Now, of these two statements, which one is significant for me? If I have not consulted the internet, I would not know what the speed of light is. Yes, it is a fact but a fact that I simply don’t care about. But the unverifiable statement about my friend, while it would qualify as non-sense for Wittgenstein, is something that I do care about.
Meaning yields significance. What is meaningful for me are those things that I consider significant and even essential in my life. But I notice that the higher the significance of a thing, the lesser empirically verifiable it is. Friendship, love and values are significant for me yet it would be hard for me to prove them as verifiable facts. Yet this does not diminish their meaning for me. If I climb a mountain and on top of that mountain as I survey my surrounding, I exclaim, “God!” I am not uttering a nonsensical word. I am certainly aware of the fact of the beauty of the scenery yet beyond this fact is a recognition of a higher reality – God. When I say “God” it is not non-sense for me, I am expressing a fact, a fact based on the reality of things yet somehow beyond what is seen in this reality.
Language is complex. Its propositions can state verifiable facts but also on some occasions refer to realities that are simply beyond descriptions. What it can hope to do in these occasions is to simply “point” to these realities and as such cannot be simply descriptive of facts. Limiting significant language only to those which can be verified in fact or to what is logical or to what can “picture reality” would not only consign us to silence but imprison us to a poverty of spirit.
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